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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Lemmons was charged with two counts of Trafficking in Methamphetamine, I.C. 
§§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(c), 18-204, in Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2011-
0014836. (R. pp. 16-18.) Lemmons was also charged in Twin Falls County Case No. 
CR-2012-0010131, with two counts of Conspiracy to Traffic in Methamphetamine, 
Felony, LC.§§ 37-2732b(a)(4)(A), 37-2732B(c), 18-1701. (R., pp. 567-570.) Both 
criminal cases were consolidated for the purposes of trial, therefore, the charges at issue 
in the t1ial total four ( 4) counts of criminal conduct as set forth in their respective 
Infom1ation(s ). 
At trial in this matter, counsel for Lemmons made a Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal after the conclusion of the presentation of the State's case. (Trial Tr. p. 352, Ll. 
11-12.) Counsel for Lemmons argued that the State could not meet one or more of the 
elements of the four ( 4) charges against Lemmons and, therefore, should be granted an 
acquittal. (Trial Tr. p. 355, Ll. 9-12.) The Court denied Lemmons' Motion at that time. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four (4) 
counts of criminal conduct. Lemmons filed a Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
and Motion for New Trial on or about June 13, 2013. (R. pp. 416-418, 838-840.) After 
hearing on the Renewed Motion, the Comi granted Lemmons request for a new trial in its 
Order Granting Motion for New Trial in Part, Denying Motion for New Trial in Part, and 
Denying Motion for Acquittal. (R. pp. 452-453, 873-874.) Lemmons filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support Thereof on or about July 25, 2013, (R. pp. 
468-478, 889-899.) The Court entered an Order on or about August 26, 2013, finding 
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that Defendant's Motion for Acquittal as a matter of law as to Conspiracy to Traffic in 
Methamphetamine and the enhancement on each delivery charge (trafficking) is granted 
and Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Acquittal as to Delivering Methamphetamine is 
denied. [emphasis added.] 
The Order on Lemmons' Motion for Reconsideration is somewhat confusing in 
that the District Court treated the charge of Trafficking as an "enhancement" to the charge 
of Delivery. (Trial Tr. pp. 382-383.) \Vhile it may not be clear on its face, that Order 
effectively resulted in an acquittal of all four counts of criminal conduct set fo1ih in their 
respective Infonnation(s). However, given that the District Court treated the charge of 
Trafficking as Delivery with an enhancement, the District Court determined that 
Lemmons would remain convicted of two counts of Delivery of Methamphetamines, even 
though those charges were not contained in either of the Infonnation(s). 
Lemmons appeals only the denial of her Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 
Renewed Judgment of Acquittal, and Motion for Reconsideration as to the two counts of 
Delivery, only. Lemmons specifically did not appeal that paii of the Order which relates 
to acquittal of the charges contained in Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2012-1013. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
LEMMON"S 1VIOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACOUITAL MADE 
DURING TRIAL. 
At trial in this matter, counsel for Lemmons made a Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal after the conclusion of the presentation of the State's case. (Trial Tr. p. 352, LL 
11-12.) Counsel for Lemmons argued that the State could not meet one or more of the 
elements of the four ( 4) charges against Lemmons and, therefore, should be granted an 
acquittal. (Trial Tr. p. 355, LL 9-12.) The Court denied Lemmons' Motion at that time. 
It stands to reason that the Trial Court should have granted Lemmons' Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal made after the conclusion of the State's case given that the Court 
ultimately did, in fact, grant Lemmons' Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal at the 
conclusion of the presentation of all of the evidence. Lemmons filed a Renewed Motion 
for Judgment of Acquittal and Motion for New Trial on or about June 13, 2013. (R. pp. 
416-418, 838-840.) After hearing on the Renewed Motion, the Court granted Lemmons' 
request for a new trial in its Order Granting Motion for New Trial in Part, Denying 
Motion for New Trial in Part, and Denying Motion for Acquittal. (R. pp. 452-453, 873-
874.) 
Lemmons filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support 
Thereof on or about July 25, 2013, (R. pp. 468-478, 889-899.) The Court entered an 
Order on or about August 26, 2013, finding that Defendant's Motion for Acquittal as a 
matter of law as to Conspiracy to Traffic in Methamphetamine and the enhancement on 
each delivery charge (trafficking) is granted and Defendant's Motion for New Trial or 
.., 
- :i -
Acquittal as to Delivering Methamphetamine is denied. [ emphasis added.] 
It is clear from the parties' briefing that given that the Trial Comi granted an 
acquittal based upon the finding that the State's evidence was legally insufficient to 
sustain a conviction, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions precludes retrial. See generally Evans v. Michigan, 133 S.Ct. 1069 (2013). 
In the recent Idaho case of State v. Carmouche, 317 P .3d 728 (2013 ), the Com1 
discussed the Double Jeopardy effect of an acquittal as follows: 
\Ve first address Cannouche's argument that the State's appeal is rendered 
moot by constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution directs that no person shall 
be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense. Article I, § 
13 of the Idaho Constitution similarly specifies that "[n]o person shall be 
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." \Vhen a trial court enters a 
judgment of acquittal based on a deten11ination that the evidence is 
factually insufficient to support a charge, the prohibition against double 
jeopardy bars retrying the individual for the same offense. Smalis v. 
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 144-46 (1986); State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 
750, 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975). 
Under Idaho law, when alleged for purposes of a persistent violator 
sentence enhancement, the fact of the defendant's prior convictions must 
be proved to the trier of fact at the trial of the primary charge. I.C.R. 7(c); 
State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51, 59-62, 383 P.2d 326, 330-333 (1963); State 
v. Scheminisky, 31 Idaho 504, 507, 174 P. 611, 611-12 (1918). The State 
does not dispute that the constitutional prohibition against a second trial 
after acquittal applies to trials of persistent violator sentence 
enhancements. See, e.g., United States v. Blanton, 476 F.3d 767, 769-71 
(9th Cir. 2007); State v. Sawatzky, 125 P.3d 722, 726 (Or. 2005). 
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits reexamination of a comi-decreed 
acquittal to the same extent that it prohibits reexamination of acquittal by a 
jury. Smith v. A1assachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005); State v. Howard, 
150 Idaho 471,478,248 P.3d 722, 729 (2011). This prohibition generally 
precludes the State from obtaining a new trial through the pursuit of an 
appeal after a defendant has been acquitted of a charged offense. See, e.g., 
United States v .. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977). As 
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stated by the United States Supreme Court, "it is one of the elemental 
principles of our criminal law that the government cannot secure a new 
trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be 
erroneous. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). "[T]he 
Double Jeopardy Clause bars a postacquittal appeal by the prosecution not 
only when it might result in a second trial, but if reversal would translate 
into fmiher proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual 
issues going to the elements of the offense charged." Smalis, 476 U.S. at 
145-46 ( citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Arizona v. 
Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1984); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 
358,370 (1975). 
Carmouche also discussed the exception to the Double Jeopardy preclusion of 
merits based acquittals as follows: 
There is an exception, however, to this bar to appellate relief for the State. 
Double jeopardy does not prohibit the appeal of a comi-ordered acquittal 
entered after a jury has first returned a guilty verdict, because reversal of 
the comi's acquittal will not require a new trial. In Smith, 543 U.S. at 467, 
the United States Supreme Court explained: 
\Vhen a jury returns a verdict of guilty and a trial judge ( or 
an appellate court) sets aside that verdict and enters a 
judgment of acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
preclude a prosecution appeal to reinstate the jury verdict of 
guilty. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-353 [95 
S. Ct. 1013, 1026, 43 L.Ed.2d 232, 246-247] (1975). But if 
the prosecution has not yet obtained a conviction, further 
proceedings to secure one are impennissible: "[S]ubjecting 
the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going 
to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause." 
Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 [106 S. Ct. 
1745, 1749, 90 L. Ed. 2d 116, 122] (1986). 
The case of Carmouche goes on to discuss whether or not the "verdict" or "oral 
finding of the judge" made by the Trial Court at the conclusion of that case would 
constitute a final resolution of the factual issues that could be reinstated if the Appellate 
Court were to find enor in the District Court's ruling. 
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It is apparent from the record that the jury reached a verdict after the conclusion of 
the presentation of all of the evidence. However, as set f01ih above, it stands to reason 
that the Trial Comi's ultimate grant of an acquittal relates back to Lemmons' initial 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal made at the conclusion of the presentation of the 
State's evidence. It is important to note that Lemmons renewed her Motion for Judgment 
of Acquittal as opposed to filing a new Motion. 
The Court en-ed in failing to grant Lemmons an acquittal on her initial Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal. This en-or cannot be said to be hannless, given that should the 
Court have granted the acquittal at the conclusion of the presentation of the State's 
evidence, said decision, even if wrongfully made, would have ban-ed a retrial as well as 
ban-ing the State's request to reinstate a verdict. Should the Court have granted that 
acquittal, the defense would not have been required to present its evidence, nor would it 
be necessary to address jury instructions. Obviously, such an outcome would not result in 
a final verdict as required by Carmouche, and would not trigger the exception to the 
Double Jeopardy Bar. 
In any case, Lemmons asserts that the Trial Court's granting of an Acquittal was 
proper, it just didn't go far enough in that the Court denied Lemmon's request for an 
acquittal as to the two (2) counts of Delivery, allegedly lesser included offenses of 
Trafficking. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRI\NT LEMMONS AN 
ACQUITTAL, OR A NEW '.fRIAL, AS TO THE TWO (2) COUNTS 
OF DELIVERY. 
In the alternative to acquittal, Lemmons seeks a new trial as to the two (2) counts 
of Delivery on the basis that the District Court failed to grant Lemmons her requested jury 
instruction relating to the credibility of the inforn1ant( s ). 
First·of all, the District Court in trying the case refused to give a requested 
inforn1ant instruction based on the fact that Idaho State law did not require same, despite 
Ninth Circuit law requiring such an instruction if requested. 
It is clear that under the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, 
cl. 2, federal legislation enacted pursuant to constitutionally derived federal authority 
trumps a conflicting state law, even if the state law furthers a court police power interest. 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). "(The 
Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal 
and state law, federal law shall prevail"). 
However, in the principal case, there actually isn't any conflicting law involved. 
There just isn't any state law requiring such an instruction. Based upon that fact, i.e., the 
absence of state law, the Comi in this case refused to follow Ninth Circuit law and give 
the requested instruction. It is Lemmons' position that said refusal violated Lemmons' 
rights to due process. 
In the instant case, the Trial Court detern1ined that the witness "was an infonnant 
and is a paid infonnant. (Trial Tr. p. 390, LI. 7-14.) Counsel for the Defense even stated 
that the Infonnant had testified that he was paid on a contingency fee. (Trial Tr. p. 386, 
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LL 6-10.) Therefore, Lemmons' right to due process was violated. The requested 
instruction itself is contained in the Clerk's Record. (R. pp. 368-370.) 
The second issue supporting Lemmons' Motion for Retrial on Delivery charge(s) 
is that the State, in its closing argument, indicated to the jury a fact not in evidence, i.e., 
indicated that his witness had represented that an ounce was ''more than 28 grams" (Trial 
Tr. p. 411, LL 6-8) when, in fact, the witness had only indicated that an ounce was 
"approximately 28 grams". (Trial Tr. p. 342, 1. 4.) This was a clear misrepresentation of 
the evidence in the case and clearly amounted to an improper closing argument by the 
Prosecuting Attorney. 
The fact is there is no rule of trial practice more universally accepted and applied 
than the rule that counsel may not introduce into his argument to the jury statements 
unsupported by evidence produced on the trial and made not as expressions of belief or 
proof, but as assertions of fact. State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515,438 P.2d 455, In Re: Care 
and Treatment of Ontiberos, 295 Kan. 10,287 P.3d 855 (2012). 
Further, in State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 594 P .2d 146 (1979), it was held that 
improper closing argument by the prosecuting attorney constituted "fundamental error" 
and was therefore reviewable on appeal notwithstanding the fact that no objection had 
been made by defense counsel during the trial. 
The fact is that in the principal case, objection was made to the jury by defense 
counsel to the misstatements of the evidence by the State. 
Based on the above citations, and specifically State v. Garcia, it is Lemmons' 
belief that the actions on the part of the State in misrepresenting facts not in evidence to 
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the jury, violated Lemmons' right to due process and demand a retrial on the charge of 
Delivery, if not an acquittal. 
Of course, the relevant and critical issue here is whether the State's comments so 
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process. Darden v. Waynewright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). In 
applying the hannless enor rule, the Idaho Courts have held that where the admissible 
evidence provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, "overwhelming and conclusive" proof of 
defendant's guilt, the admission of tainted evidence will be held to be harmless. 
Chapnzan v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 78 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 
However, in the principal case, the State's misrepresentations could hardly be 
considered hannless enor wherein that was the only source of evidence that one ounce 
equals "more than 28 grams" throughout the entire trial. In other words, that statement by 
the State in its closing argument can be the only source from which the jury detennined 
that there were "28 grams or more" of narcotics involved thereby completely eliminating 
the possibility of the State's misstatements amounting to harn1less enor. 
There is no question that the State made improper statements to the jury in 
indicating to them that the State's witness had testified that there were "more than 28 
grams in an ounce" because the State's witness never said that. That evidence, which was 
not presented at trial, goes to the very element that was necessary to prove the charge, i.e., 
that there were "more than 28 grams" of substance involved. So, that statement was 
improper. 
As to the question as to whether it had any affect on the outcome of the verdict, 
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the matter simply speaks for itself. The place that evidence came from was from the State 
during closing argument and it is obvious that it has affected the jury because it was a 
unanimous verdict that there had been "more than 28 grams". Therefore, it is, ipso facto, 
a tainted verdict. 
Counsel for Lemmons acknowledges the three paii test relating to prosecutorial 
misconduct and fundamental error was referenced by the State and is set forth in 
Carmouche. To establish fundamental error in this regard, Lemmons must persuade the 
Court that the alleged error 1) violates one or more of her unwaived constitutional rights; 
2) the en-or is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional 
infom1ation not contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the outcome of 
the trial proceedings. Carmouche at 339, citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226 
(2010). 
It is clear tlrnt Lemmons has met each of the elements of the three prong test set 
fo1ih in Carmouche. The error is clear and obvious and is set forth in the record. The 
Prosecutor clearly stated in closing argument that an officer had testified that there were 
"more than 28 grams in an ounce". (Trial Tr. p. 411, LL 6-8.) It is also clear and obvious 
that the witness actually testified that there was "approximately 28 grains in an ounce." 
(Trial Tr. p. 342, 1. 4.) 
It is also clear that the statement made by the prosecution affected the outcome of 
the trial proceedings given that the jury convicted Lemmons of all four counts of criminal 
conduct even though no evidence had been introduced as to the conversion between an 
ounce and grains. The crime of Trafficking requires an element that Lemmons represent 
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the quantity of drugs to be 28 grams or more. (Idaho Code Section 37-2732B.) VVhile it 
may be a scientific fact that one ounce is equal to 28.35 grams, that infonnation was not 
provided to the jury. In addition, it is not clear that the fact that one ounce is equal to 
28.35 grams is not subject to reasonable dispute. 
Finally, it is clear from the record that Lemmons did not waive any Constitutional 
rights relative to her jury trial. As such, all of Lemmons' Constitutional rights were in 
effect at her jury trial including, but not limited to, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as those rights conveyed upon her 
by the Idaho Constitution. 
As such, it is clear that the prosecutorial misconduct in Lemmons' trial amounts 
to fundamental error and should result in a new trial as to the t\vo counts of Delivery in 
the event that this Court does not acquit her of those charges. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Lemmons requests that the State's appeal be dismissed and that 
they take nothing thereby. Lemmons also requests that she be granted an acquittal as to 
the two counts of Delivery of Methamphetamines. In the alternative, Le1mnons requests 
that she be granted a new trial as to the two counts of Delivery of Methamphetamines. 
DATED This 3rd day of June, 2013. 
FULLER LAW OFFICES 
(~ 
' \\ 
DA'kfir' S. BROWN 
Attorney for Cross-Appellant 
- 11 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the 3rd day of June, 2014, I caused two 
true and conect copies of the foregoing document to be mailed, United States Mail, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Lawrence Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
- 12 -
